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Reply to Dews, and a Plea for Schelling 
 
Sebastian Gardner 
 
1. Peter Dews examines two contrasting interpretations of the Freiheitsschrift – Markus 
Gabriel's, which takes ontology as the work's main concern, and my own, which reads 
Schelling as employing a practical strategy – and argues that each reveals serious 
limitations, recognition of which leads to a more comprehensive view of the work.1 
Dews goes on to conclude that, contra what Gabriel and I (each on different grounds) 
imply, the Freiheitsschrift does not succeed in its aim but rather falls between two 
stools, Schelling's deficiencies in 1809 pointing towards the great innovations of his late 
philosophy. 
 The common criticism that Dews makes of Gabriel and myself is that we neglect 
the vital methodological condition that Schelling lays down at the outset of the 
Freiheitsschrift, that a theory of freedom must both accord with the first-person 
perspective from within which we enjoy a feeling of freedom, and embed freedom in an 
objective system of concepts; one-sidedly, Gabriel takes the second route and I take the 
former. Dews's specific criticism of my interpretation is that it attributes to Schelling an 
argument inconsistent with the view of morality articulated in the Freiheitsschrift. The 
potential for dissonance to which Dews rightly draws attention is something I had 
overlooked and neglect of the relevant issues constitutes a weakness in my presentation, 
though I am not convinced that the implications for the interpretation itself are as 
serious as Dews suggests, for reasons that I will try to explain. Because the general 
issues surrounding Schelling's philosophical methodology and ethical theory deserve 
clarification on their own account, what follows may hold independent interest. 
 One potential source of resistance to the attribution to Schelling of a Kantian-
Fichtean style argument from first-person normative consciousness – not identified by 
Dews in so many words but perhaps in the vicinity of his concerns – derives from 
uncertainty that Schelling, in 1809 if not before, allows transcendental proof to be self-
supporting. The dual system approach which Schelling had adopted in 1800 allowed 
transcendental philosophy to proceed under its own steam, methodologically 
independent from Naturphilosophie, but by the time of the Freiheitsschrift, when both 
the dual system model and the Identity Philosophy's unification of the two systems have 
been left in abeyance, the picture has become unclear. In addition and more particularly, 
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whatever Schelling may think of transcendental method in 1809, longer-term 
uncertainty surrounds his view of the probative value of practical self-consciousness. 
This goes right back to his 'Fichtean' texts of 1794–98, which give different indications 
concerning what is proven by the transcendental philosopher's discovery of an act of 
freedom at the core of self-consciousness. To be sure, the vacillations or at any rate 
variations in the weight Schelling puts on practical self-consciousness reflect the 
difficulties he encounters in completing his project of unifying Freedom and Nature, 
and to that extent I agree with Dews that the Freiheitsschrift lies under the shadow of a 
high-level lack of integration in Schelling's thought. The moral I would draw from this, 
however, is that, precisely because in 1809 Schelling still has no fixed and final account 
of a single philosophical method which would synthesize its Freedom- and Nature-
related, and its a priori and a posteriori aspects, Schelling does not preclude, rather he 
leaves scope for, a metaphysical derivation from practical self-consciousness, even if 
the results thereof stand in need of revalidation from a standpoint which is theoretical 
rather than practical and which does not confine itself to the transcendental method.2 In 
short, Schelling's requirement that freedom be located in a system of concepts does not 
preclude an argument that extrapolates metaphysics from moral consciousness, even if 
he cannot allow it to be the whole story. 
 Dews's objection, however, is more finely focussed. It is that Schelling in 1809 
'no longer thinks that there is any such thing as the normativity of pure practical reason' 
and rejects the associated conception of 'the moral person as divided between 
transcendental freedom and the pull of empirical incentives',3 and therefore cannot 
intend to argue in the way I propose. Let me now expand on what I said in my paper, 
briefly and obscurely, concerning Schelling's transformation of Kant's Fact of Reason, 
in a way that aims to take account of and accommodate the important points that Dews 
presses against my interpretation. 
 Indisputably Schelling in the Freiheitsschrift sets himself against Kant's thesis of 
the efficacy of pure practical reason and his identification of the moral law with the 
principle of autonomy, from which it follows that Schelling cannot be endorsing the 
Fact of Reason as it stands in the second Critique – since that argument is designed 
precisely to establish cognition of the intelligible ground of transcendental freedom 
presupposed by the moral law conceived as the principle of autonomy. It is also beyond 
doubt, and stands in close connection with the preceding, that Schelling's account of 
moral goodness is not Kant's: the moral goodness of an agent, on Schelling's 
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conception, is owed not to the motivational sufficiency of the agent's pure practical 
reason but to the agent's total, nature-inclusive being. 
 Putting these two points together, it may well seem that Schelling not only 
rejects the conclusion of Kant's Fact of Reason deduction but has also destroyed the 
basis for any argument of its kind: if the agent qua natural being is factored into 
normative consciousness, then this can no longer be regarded as pure in the way 
required for Schelling to be interpreted in the way I suggested. More broadly, it may 
seem that a transcendental construal of the Freiheitsschrift, as well as putting all the 
emphasis on the first-person point of view, confines itself to the Freedom side of Kant's 
great dualism and, aside from adding a new focus on evil, understands this in terms no 
different from Kant, or Fichte – as if Schelling's anti-Fichtean metaphysics of Nature 
made no difference to how he conceives rational self-consciousness. 
 While Dews is right to insist on the two fundamental points cited above as 
marking Schelling's distance from Kant, it does not follow, I think, that Schelling 
cannot employ the same distinctive form of argument from normative consciousness to 
ratio essendi. What allows him to do so, in short, is that the ultimate grounds of moral 
cognition and volition remain for him, as for Kant, exclusively a priori: for Schelling 
too moral consciousness is pure, even though it does not consist in consciousness of 
pure practical reason. It is so because the motivational value of empirical particularity – 
the normative weight that I attach to whatever motives arise from my natural being – is 
not the immediate effect of my existence as a particular in nature, but derives from the 
pre-empirical choice that I make at the non-temporal moment of my creation: the pure 
choice that I make before entering the temporal stream of Nature is what determines the 
motivational significance and moral valency that nature within me has, once I have 
entered into it. So although for Schelling the moral agent does indeed exhibit (as Dews 
emphasizes) a fusion of practical reason with natural-empirical particularity – what the 
Schellingian agent judges it to be right to do, and wills to do, is an expression of, and is 
necessitated by, her total nature as a particularized natural being – the very unity of this 
whole, by virtue of which the agent is not (as per Kant) a mere Freedom-Nature 
compound but rather some sort of identity of the two, has a non-empirical ground. 
 Schelling's transformation of Kant's moral psychology has something important 
in common, structurally, with Schiller's earlier grappling with Kant's Freedom/Nature 
dichotomy. Central to the Letters on Aesthetic Education is the claim that self-
determination is inadequately conceived (or worse) so long as it excludes Nature, 
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empirical particularity, and confines itself merely to agreement with universal Reason. 
Schiller presents himself accordingly as attempting to save Kantian self-determination 
from Kant's own narrow rationalistic miscontrual of it. Schelling, by contrast, rejects the 
concept. Yet they concur in thinking that, in order to have reality, freedom and moral 
goodness must be properties of the person as a whole, meaning that what Kant treats as 
external to normative consciousness – the Neigungen that, according to Kant, must first 
be taken up into maxims in order to yield reasons for action – must be relocated within 
it. And the parallel extends to the means which they employ to achieve this result: just 
as Schelling's unification of Freedom and Nature turns on a pre-empirical act of choice 
(the point made above), so too does Schiller's solution, in the argumentative heart of the 
Letters, turn on the postulation of a pre-empirical state of 'unlimited determinability' in 
the formation of our mental powers.4 They agree, therefore, that the two dimensions of 
human personality that Kant painstakingly separates cannot, as they stand, be merely 
glued together or co-mingled, and that the unity of free moral agency must have its 
source (which Schelling locates in a choice coincident with the subject's creation and 
Schiller in a retreat to pre-natal indetermination facilitated by aesthetic experience) 
independently of and prior to the agent's empirical existence as a particular in nature.5 In 
that sense, both uphold Kant's conception of a pure a priori foundation for normativity 
in general. And it is the manifestation of this pre-empirical ground in moral awareness 
that, in Schelling, gives normative consciousness its authority as a datum for 
metaphysical extrapolation. 
 The full importance of Nature for Schelling's argument, on my construal, 
emerges when we directly compare his theory of evil with Kant's. A fundamental point 
in Kant's argument is that we must avoid attributing to human beings an a priori interest 
in evil for its own sake: to attribute such a will to man is to make him either (i) a 
'diabolical being', which his capacity for the good will precludes, or (ii) 'morally good 
and evil at the same time', which is contradictory.6 An evil will must therefore not be 
understand as directed at its object qua evil. Hence Kant's claim that the opposition of 
good and evil can be represented only as a matter of the prioritization of one of two 
principles, the moral law and the principle of self-love, over the other.7 Though the 
principles must stand on the same level, in so far as an intelligible choice is made 
between them, they are unequal in a key respect: the moral law expresses the ground of 
its own necessity (pure reason), whereas the agent's prioritization of the principle of 
self-love is groundless or rather whatever ground it may have is 'inscrutable'. The 
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structure Kant describes thus combines symmetry (the principles are equally both 
practical alternatives) with asymmetry (regarding their rational modality), and it is 
designed to provide for the reality of evil without imputing a diabolical will. What it 
fails to supply, in Schelling's terms, rendering Kant's solution 'merely formal', is a 
ground of the possibility of a real opposition of good and evil: without some insight into 
what is at stake for the agent in their choice of either good or evil, it is impossible to 
understand how they can actually conflict, how the subordination of the one principle to 
the other can be an issue for the will of an agent, rather than merely subsisting as logical 
alternatives. Kant is of course fully aware that moral conflict cannot be understood as a 
confrontation of normative consciousness with what lies outside it, but nor has he, 
Schelling claims, shown how it can be understood as a diremption within it. The 
Kantian counter-claim is that any attempt to supply the allegedly missing insight – any 
greater degree of 'realism' about evil – will run foul of the absurdity of attributing a 
diabolical will; Kant's thesis of noumenal ignorance is consequently indispensable for 
the imputability of evil actions, just as his thesis of the transcendental ideality of 
empirical reality is indispensable for the attribution of freedom. 
 Schelling meets the challenge by employing Kant's own structure, but 
transposing it into an ontological key. Following Kant, Schelling plots the relation of 
good and evil along two dimensions: on the one (ontological groundedness) they are 
symmetrical, and on the other (rational warrant) they are not. This combination of 
symmetry and asymmetry is not left hanging, as in Kant, but provides the epistemic 
basis for, and is taken to derive metaphysically from, a corresponding combination in 
their ontological grounds. Each is aligned with a different relation of Grund and 
Existenz: in the case of the good, Existenz has precedence over Grund, in that of evil, 
Grund has precedence over Existenz. These structures derive in turn from the inherent 
differences of Grund and Existenz, and the symmetry-and-asymmetry of their relation: 
each grounds the other, according to Schelling's theory of God and Nature, but in 
inverse senses. The Grund-Existenz configuration, being metaphysically ultimate, closes 
all possibility of further explanation. It has thus been explained how it is possible for 
evil to figure positively in normative consciousness without imputing a diabolical will. 
 One crucial condition for Schelling to do all this is his rejection of a basic 
assumption that Kant makes concerning the form that normative consciousness 
necessarily takes. Kant assumes that normativity can take only one form, namely that of 
a principle of practical reasoning;8 his justification being of course that anything else 
Page 5 of 14
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/bjhp
British Journal for the History of Philosophy
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
6 
 
would of necessity amount to a mere empirical cause. If Kant's assumption of the 
mutual exclusivity of Freedom and Nature stands, then Schelling's claim to have 
improved on Kant's theory is defeated: since, on that assumption, whatever ontological 
grounds Schelling may posit will only figure for the agent, and be capable of bearing on 
her will, once (and in so far as) they have been represented as, translated into, principles 
of reasoning. This would take us all the way back to Kant's theory of evil, and leave us 
facing once again the unanswerable question concerning the (principled?) basis on 
which the evil agent prioritizes the principle of self-love above the moral law.9 But 
Schelling of course rejects Kant's Freedom/Nature dualism, and this allows normativity 
to reside in Nature. What exactly normativity-in-nature amounts to for Schelling is a 
topic of its own, but for present purposes all it means is that the principle of evil active 
in man need not be identified with a principle of reasoning, without thereupon being 
reduced to a non-normative Kantian empirical cause. This allows the pull of evil to be 
genuinely normative, without its grip being identified with the endorsement of a 
principle's rational validity. Schelling's assumption of the presence of Nature within 
normative consciousness – or at the very least, his rejection of Kant's exclusion of it – is 
therefore crucial for his construction of a theory of evil which supplies what Kant lacks. 
To return to the earlier issue of Schelling's methodology, the derivation of metaphysics 
from normative consciousness that he on my reading proposes might be described, not 
exactly as naturphilosophisch transcendentalism (since no specific doctrines of Nature 
drive Schelling's argument), but simply as a transcendental argument liberated from 
Kant's restrictive assumption of the mutual exclusivity of Freedom and Nature. 
 One final remark. There is an important respect in which Schelling, for all of his 
disparagement of Kantian-Fichtean ethics, remains Kantian, indeed formalist, in his 
thinking about morality. Kant's expositions of his moral theory begin with an analytic, 
which is all-determining for the resulting metaphysics of morals: it is because the 
ordinary concept of a good will leads to the concept of a principle that motivates by 
virtue of its formal property of universality, that the moral law ultimately comes to be 
identified with autonomy. Schelling does not provide an analytic, but he leaves us in no 
doubt concerning the correct analysis of the concept of the Good: transposing Kant's 
identification of morality with universal law, the Freiheitsschrift aligns goodness and 
love with universality, and evil with particularity. Universality takes a different shape in 
Schelling – for whom it is, as said above, not first and foremost a property of a 
principle, but rather a matter of the form of an agent's selfhood – but he sustains the 
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formalistic alignment of moral distinctions with metaphysical categories, and this is 
crucial for his inference from normative consciousness to its ratio essendi. 
 If what I have said is right, then, although claims for the practical-Kantian 
interpretation of the Freiheitsschrift must be qualified and clarified in the ways Dews 
shows to be necessary – and, as Dews also indicates, the work must also be reevaluated 
in light of Schelling's later development – it does not follow that the interpretation itself 
is awry. 
 
2. The difference of Dews's and my respective appraisals of the Freiheitsschrift should 
be seen against the background of our fundamental agreement concerning the interest 
which the work holds not simply as a moment in Schelling's development but as an 
account of human freedom. Since this is hardly a mainstream view, it is worthwhile to 
say something about its basis, as I understand it. What follows is intended to 
complement and supplement the argument that Dews gives in Part III of his paper 
concerning the need for a speculative theory of freedom. 
 The Freiheitsschrift is, all too obviously, not a resource drawn on when 
contemporary philosophers (in the analytic tradition, at any rate) reflect on the problem 
of free will. Its present-day readers are those whose historical interest in classical 
German philosophy extends beyond the obvious landmarks of Kant and Hegel, and 
those, such as Žižek, who are constructing general philosophical positions of their own 
in dialogue with classical German thought. In this respect it is not on its own, however. 
Contemporary discussion of freedom in the analytic anglophone sphere is almost 
completely dissociated from the classical German legacy.10 As Dews indicates, the one 
element that has survived, due largely to P. F. Strawson, is the notion of the 'practical 
point of view', which Kant is widely supposed to have shown to be in some important 
way self-validating. Kant's intelligible causality has no place and is mentioned only, like 
Schopenhauer's variant of the theory, as an absurdity to be avoided. Fichte's and Hegel's 
accounts of freedom, if they surface at all, do so in the context of rights and political 
theory. That more than half a century of intensive philosophical activity dedicated to 
establishing the possibility and actuality of human freedom should be taken to boil 
down to one fragmentary footnote in which Kant reports a provisional step in an 
argument not yet completed – this surely demands explanation: How has it come about 
that one of the great developments in modern philosophy, which unified itself around 
the concept of freedom and devoted page after page to expositing the meaning and 
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implications of a concept which has lost none of its importance and with which no later 
philosophical development can plausibly claim to have made substantial progress, has 
absolutely no significance whatsoever for contemporary thought about the topic? 
 One point should be made immediately, in order to rule out what might seem the 
obvious answer: it cannot be the 'metaphysicality' as such of classical German theories 
of freedom that explains their contemporary irrelevance, since metaphysical 
commitments abound in the theories of historical authors who do hold a place in 
contemporary discussion, and many contemporary theorists of free will who are 
indifferent to historical writings invest heavily in general metaphysics. (Nor can it be 
attributed to the nominally 'idealistic' character of classical German metaphysics, given 
their huge diversity on every dimension.) Some other explanation is required, and it is 
reasonable to suppose that it has to do with the way in which the problem of freedom is 
conceived in classical German philosophy. My suggestion is that it results from what 
may be called the all or nothing character of freedom and of the task that it sets, in the 
post-Kantian conception.11 By this is meant that (1) freedom and value in general are 
regarded as essentially interconnected, such that (a) freedom is necessary and sufficient 
for the possibility of value, and (b) no methodological mistake is involved in attempting 
to elucidate or vindicate freedom through axiological reflection; (2) freedom, though 
necessarily expressed empirically, is independent from and immunized against 
empirical contingency – in the jargon, it belongs to the unconditioned; (3) freedom must 
pertain to the whole of human personality or to its deepest root, such that (a) the 
distinction between subjecthood and freedom is a conceptual and not a real distinction, 
and (b) if the attribute of freedom comes late in the metaphysical explication of what 
constitutes a human being, then its reality will to all effect have been denied rather than 
provided for. 
 Up to a point the conception is recognizably Kantian: transcendental freedom as 
Kant conceives it certainly satisfies (1) and (2). What is not so clear is that Kant's theory 
of freedom succeeds in satisfying (3), even though it is hard to see on what grounds 
Kant could reject it. If we now turn to Jacobi, we find a forceful statement of the all-or-
nothing conception which helps to explain the uneasiness concerning Kant's account 
which motivates the German Idealists' theories of freedom. In the first edition of his 
Spinoza Letters, Jacobi protests against determinism on the following grounds: 
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The whole thing comes down to this: from fatalism I immediately conclude 
against fatalism and everything connected with it. — If there are only efficient, 
but no final, causes, then the only function that the faculty of thought has in the 
whole of nature is that of observer; its proper business is to accompany the 
mechanism of the efficient causes. The conversation that we are now having 
together is only an affair of our bodies; and the whole content of the 
conversation, analysed into its elements, is extension, movement, degree of 
velocity, together with their concepts, and the concepts of these concepts. The 
inventor of the clock did not ultimately invent it; he only witnessed its coming to 
be out of blindly self-developing forces. So too Raphael, when he sketched the 
School of Athens, and Lessing, when he composed his Nathan. The same goes 
for all philosophizing, arts, forms of governance, sea and land wars – in brief, 
for everything possible. For affects and passions would have no effect either, so 
far as they are sensations and thoughts; or more precisely, so far as they carry 
sensations and thoughts with them. We only believe that we have acted out of 
anger, love, magnanimity, or out of rational decision. Mere illusion! What 
fundamentally moves us in all these cases is something that knows nothing of all 
that, and which is to this extent absolutely devoid of sensations and thoughts. 
These, the sensations and thoughts, are however only concepts of extension, 
movement, degrees of velocity, etc. – Now, if someone can accept this, then I 
cannot refute his opinion. But if one cannot, then one must be at the antipodes 
from Spinoza.12 
 
The particular interest of this passage, stripped of extraneous features, is Jacobi's notion 
of freedom as diffused throughout human personality, co-extensive with and 
constitutive of the total range of internal subject-constituting phenomena, such that 
denial of freedom would entail our elimination, or at any rate would leave us hollowed 
out, spiritless. Whether Kant need strictly disagree with anything Jacobi says here is 
uncertain, but in any case we do not find in Kant any similarly forthright affirmation of 
the foundational status and comprehensive reach of freedom. 
 The analysis I gave of the all-or-nothing conception of human freedom is only 
an approximation,13 and a lengthy treatment would be required to substantiate the claim 
that it is original to and distinctive of classical German philosophy.14 That said, it 
provides two things which are needed: a direct explanation for the non-relevance of 
classical German theories to contemporary discussion, and a basis on which we can 
identify what is specific to the way Schelling conceives freedom in the Freiheitsschrift. 
To take the first of these: Although the all-or-nothing conception does not entail a 
commitment to indeterminism, it does rule out ab initio all forms of empirical 
compatibilism – the very type of position most widely believed to offer the best 
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prospects for the defence of human freedom.15 In addition, it means that a constructive 
speculative method of some sort, yielding metaphysical claims of a very general and 
most likely revisionary nature, is required if human freedom is to be grasped 
adequately. From such a perspective, contemporary discussion of human freedom, in 
which arguments characteristically turn on assertions and denials of conceptual 
connections between concepts extant in the manifest and/or scientific images, and which 
pursues metaphysical possibilities conservatively, within the constraints of one or other 
of those images, appear to be engaged in a circumscribed task located at a point 
relatively far downstream, and cannot be expected to do more than map assumptions 
which would avoid precluding the possibility of human freedom. That empirical 
compatibilism consistently proves the most stable (that is to say, the least awkward) 
position in contemporary debate comes as no surprise.16 
 The specificity of the Freiheitsschrift – the contrast that it forms with other post-
Kantian speculative theories of freedom – lies in Schelling's holding fast to a 
fundamental insight of Kant's and Jacobi's, namely that there is at the level of natural 
consciousness an opacity in freedom which is indicative of its metaphysical depth. This 
opacity is a corollary of the all-or-nothingness of freedom: it becomes explicit for us 
(per Jacobi) when our reflection seeks to grasp the ground of the phenomena that we 
take to manifest our freedom, or (per Kant) when we ask what makes it possible for us 
to act under the Idea of freedom (in other words: what grounds our inalienable 
commitment to a capacity for rational determination of action). It is also connected 
closely with freedom's axiological dimension, in two ways: if the fact of freedom did 
not present itself as of a different order from other facts, then it could not matter 
primitively in the way that it does; and if freedom did not have a subterranean depth, 
then its unity could not survive the bifurcation into negative and positive conceptions 
which markedly characterizes theories of freedom.17 
 The task which classical German philosophy sets itself is to show that this 
appearance of depth is not deceptive, not an optical effect of our ignorance of concealed 
causes. One form that the project takes is the attempt of Fichte (and Hegel) to transform 
the opacity of freedom into transparency – to illuminate it all the way down. 
Accordingly the Wissenschaftslehre seeks to show that the depth of the fact of freedom 
consists in its being a 'fact' of an extraordinary kind, without parallel, one which makes 
self and world possible; but which can nonetheless be illuminated fully, because the fact 
is immanent in self-consciousness.18 
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 Whether or not he ever shared the objective of fully illuminating freedom, up 
until 1804 Schelling did not set himself in opposition to it. By 1809, however, Schelling 
had identified evil as the crucial obstacle to any such approach, and this gave him 
reason for reverting to the other strategy of classical German philosophy, explored 
earlier in the day by Kant and Jacobi, which aims to upholds the reality of freedom 
precisely by allowing it to remain in some respect cognitively unassimilated – whence 
Kant's thesis of the incomprehensibility of freedom, and Jacobi's theory of immediate 
affective-intuitive Glaube/Vernunft which no wissenschaftlich reflection can recuperate. 
The Freiheitsschrift does not straightforwardly follow their pattern, however: Schelling 
instead offers a synthesis of strategies, a combination of Kantian ignorance with 
Fichtean illumination. The true opacity in freedom, the real source of its resistance to 
rational insight, Schelling claims, is our capacity for evil, but from this datum – and by 
turning our attention away from self-consciousness and towards God sive Nature – we 
can extrapolate a metaphysics that affords the same level of insight into our existence as 
free beings as the Wissenschaftslehre claims to do. Thus it may be said indifferently 
either that the Freiheitsschrift raises the Kantian 'comprehended incomprehensibility' of 
freedom to a higher power, or that it provides an illumination of freedom as total as the 
phenomenon allows. 
 Schelling's approach to freedom is differentiated on the one side, therefore, from 
the Fichtean-Hegelian claim that speculative reflection can render freedom fully 
transparent to philosophical reflection, and on the other from the contemporary 
assumption that freedom, in order to have reality, must yield to analysis in terms of 
other and plainer concepts already in circulation. But his disagreement with our 
contemporaries is much greater than with his own. From Schelling's standpoint, the 
tendency of contemporary defences of freedom, reflecting the anti-speculative 
philosophical outlook which conditions them, is to superficialize freedom: lacking all 
conviction in the possibility of metaphysical depth, we find it necessary to suppose that 
freedom, in order to exist, must be located right at the surface. Accordingly we seek to 
align it as closely as possible with some antecedently recognized, uncontested and 
relatively unproblematic feature of our rational lives, on which we take ourselves to 
already have a firm criteriological grip – responsiveness to reasons, capacity for self-
control, governance by second-order volitions, and suchlike. What is puzzling about this 
endeavour, from the classical German perspective, is the expectation that a concept 
which carries such an extraordinary weight will allow itself to be identified with a 
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specific architecture of propositional attitudes or other psychological configuration. The 
correlative objection is that, in order to recognize facts about mental life as bearing the 
specific significance of manifesting freedom, we must already be in possession of a 
concept which is not the concept of a mere psychological condition – freedom must 
already be available as an 'Idea', or something of a similar non-empirical order, in order 
for us to interpret and experience some particular type of psychological life as that of a 
being equipped with freedom. Whatever the shortfallings of classical German 
philosophy, there is reason to regard its claim that human freedom cannot be a fact like 
any other as a lesson that needs to be relearnt. 
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Rational Theology, trans. and ed. Allen W. Wood and George di Giovanni (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 82 and 83. See also 6:22–25, pp. 71–73. 
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9 Ibid, 6:21, p. 71: 'One cannot, however, go on asking [...]'. 
10 I take the Oxford Handbook of Free Will, edited by Robert Kane (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), as representative. Kane explains in his Introduction (p. 37n2) that coverage of the 
history of free will debates would require a separate volume, and the contributions to the 
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a chapter included under 'Non-Standard Views'. Apart from P. F. Strawson, neo-Kantian writers 
such as Christine Korsgaard have no presence. 
11 Here again I am borrowing from Paul Franks. 
12 Johann Friedrich Jacobi, Concerning the Doctrine of Spinoza in Letters to Herr Moses 
Mendelssohn (1785), in The Main Philosophical Writings and the Novel 'Allwill', trans. and ed. 
George di Giovanni (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994), p. 189. 
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14 And to explore its later development in Kierkegaard, Bergson, Sartre, Heidegger, Merleau-
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Heidegger's The Essence of Human Freedom: An Introduction to Philosophy (1930), trans. Ted 
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view that human freedom cannot be regarded as merely one 'particular' philosophical problem 
among others. 
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15 Differently put, it entails that there is truth in indeterminism at the empirical level, whether or 
not indetermination per se belongs to the essence of freedom. One interesting implication of the 
all-or-nothing conception is that (some of) the terms employed by natural consciousness to 
articulate freedom – in particular and most obviously, the 'could have done otherwise' clause 
and the modal openness of the future – may be legitimate expressions of consciousness of 
freedom, without being strict conditions of its reality: if freedom is not transparent to natural 
consciousness, then the conceptual means that we ordinarily employ to signal its reality – 
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false or empty. From this it follows, contra the methodology of contemporary discussion, that 
the issue of the nature and reality of freedom cannot be decided simply by conceptual analysis 
of the terms in which we ordinarily articulate our conviction of our freedom. 
16 While it cannot by any means be said that naturalism is a shared premise of contemporary 
freedom theorists, it is at least true that, by dint of what it implicitly refuses to countenance as 
worthy of consideration, the debate is to all effect conducted under pressure from naturalism. 
Here it needs to be pointed out that, as regards taking seriously the metaphysical implications of 
natural science, the situation is no different from the 1780s, as the passage from Jacobi shows; 
what has changed is the perception of philosophical possibilities available for the defence of 
human freedom – as these have narrowed, so the concept of freedom has been contracted. 
17 This feature of the concept's behaviour, the fact that we instinctively grasp freedom on the 
one hand as an unconditional end, hence as something fully positive, and at the same time 
represent it in terms of negation, absence of constraint and so forth, without having any clear 
idea how the two dimensions are connected – a duality that the history of political thought 
displays on a large scale – is distinctive and ought to be found more puzzling than it is. 
18 For a succinct statement of Fichte's commitment to transparency, see 'Zu ''Jacobi an Fichte''' 
(1805/06), Sämmtliche Werke, ed. Immanuel Hermann Fichte (Berlin: Veit & Comp., 1845–46), 
Bd. 11, p. 390. Also relevant is Fichte's letter to Jacobi, 3 May 1810, in Johann Gottlieb Fichte's 
Leben und literarischer Briefwechsel. Die erläuternden Aktenstücke zur Biographie und den 
litterarischen Briefwechsel enthaltend, Bd. 2, ed. Immanuel Hermann Fichte (Leipzig: 
Brockhaus, 1862), pp. 179–184, which opens with what appears to be an attack on the 
Freiheitsschrift. 
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